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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14710

DON C. COFFEY,
Defendant and
Appellant.
---0000000---

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
---0000000---

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a criminal case in which

~he

Appellant was

convicted of issuing a bad check in violation of
§76-6-505, Utah Criminal Code.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On May 24, 1976, the Defendant-Appellant was tried
to a jury before the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen and found
guilty of a second degree felony.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Don

c.

Coffey, seeks a vacation of the jury

verdict and a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the
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verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant-Appellant, Don

c.

Coffey, at the time

of the alleged offense was in the business of buying,
transporting, and selling fruit.

On July 29, 1975 he

contacted one Morris Ercanbrack, a fruit grower.

The

Defendant and Mr. Ercanbrack negotiated, Mr. Ercanbrack
gave the Defendant a truckload of cherries, and the
Defendant gave

~.r.

Ercanbrack a check in the amount of

$3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie State Bank, St. George,
Utah.
The check was presented for payment and was dishonored.

The Defendant did not have sufficient funds

or credit with Dixie State Bank for payment of the
check.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CLOSE OF EVIDENCE WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED
TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROVING THE DEFENDANT'S INTENT
TO DEFRAUD WHEN IT OFFERED NO EVIDENCE ON THE POINT.
The state offered two witnesses who testified that
the Defendant issued a check to Morris Ercanbrack in
the amount of $3,560.00 drawn on the Dixie State Bank,
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St. George, Utah, in payment for a truckload of cherries.
It was stipulated that at the time the check was issued,
the Defendant did not have sufficient funds or credit
with the bank to pay the check.
§76-20-11, U.C.A. 1953 said that the making of a
check at a time when the maker has insufficient funds to
pay the check is prima facie evidence of intent to
defraud.

§76-6-505 of the Utah Criminal Code replaced

§76-20-11.

§76-6-505 is silent on what constitutes

prima facie evidence of intent to defraud.

That change

implies that the legislature intended to remove any
presumption which arises from the mere making of a
check without sufficient funds.
In State v. Bruce 1 U.2d 136, i62 P.2d 960(1953),
a case decided under the old section,· this Court
reviewed evidence which would bear on the Defendant's
intent.

Certainly, under the new section, some evidence

should be required.
jurisdictions.

Such evidence is required in other

See People v. Griffith, 120 C.A.2d 873,

262 P.2d 355.
In the instant case there was no evidence whatsoever concerning the Defendant's standing with the
bank, whether any check had ever been previously
dishonored, if other checks were issued on or around
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the same day, how long Mr. Coffey had been dealing with
the bank, or whether or not the particular check was
dishonored because of an insufficiency of funds amounting to $1.00 or to $3,500.00.

No evidence was brought

forth to establish the requisite intent except that
the check, in a normal commercial setting, was issued
and was subsequently dishonored.
Based upon the State's failure to offer evidence
of intent to defraud, the Defendant's motion to dismiss
at the close of evidence should have been granted.
See Kunkel v. Estes, 346 P.2d 185 (Oklahoma 1959).
POINT II
DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE
CLOSE OF EVIDENCE WAS ERROR BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED
TO MEET ITS STATUTORY BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THE
DEFENDANT KNEW THAT THE CHECK WOULD NOT BE PAID.
The statute which the Defendant is charged with
violating provides that the Defendant, to be guilty,
must know when he issues the check that it will not
be paid by the bank.

§76-6-505(1) Utah Criminal Code.

The only evidence on this point in the record is the
statements by both prosecution witnesses that they
had been told by the Defendant that the check was good.
This evidence, though minimally probative, indicates
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the Defendant's belief that the check would be paid.
It cannot be seriously argued that the Defendant's
knowledge should be presumed or implied.

The statute

under which the Defendant is charged provided that
knowledge will be presumed when the Defendant has no
account but establishes no presumption in any other
case.

§76-6-505(2) Utah Criminal Code.

established doctrine of inclusio unius

The well
~

exclusio

alterius requires that the statute be interpreted as
eliminating the presumption of knowledge e1'Cept as
specified.

Hansen v. Board of Education, lOl Ut. 15,

116 P.2d 936 (1941).

State v. Driscoll, 101 Mont.

348, 54 P.2d 571.
This Court in State v. Bruce, supra, stated that
conditions of the mind, including,
ledge, were capable of proof.

pre~wnably,

know-

In the instant case,

as previously stated, there was no evidence whatsoever
concerning the Defendant's standing with the bank,
whether any check had ever been previously dishonored,
if other checks were issued on or around the same

d~y,

how long Mr. Coffey had been dealing with the bank, or
whether or not the particular check was dishonored
because of an insufficiency of funds amounting to
$1.00 or to $3,500.00.

No evidence was brought forth
-5-
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to establish the requisite knowledge except that the
check, in a normal commercial setting, was issued and
was subsequently dishonored.
Based upon the State's failure to offer any
evidence as to the Defendant's knowledge, the Defendant's motion to dismiss at the close of evidence
should have been granted.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
DEFENDANT IN NOT FULLY, FAIRLY, AND CORRECTLY
INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME.
As noted previously, the statute under which
the Defendant was charged made the issuance of a
check a crime only if the Defendant knew he had no
sufficient funds or credit.

The Defendant's knowledge

is an important and essential element of the offense.
In the jury instructions given at trial, instruction number 5 purports to list the essential elements
of the crime.

Nowhere in instruction number 5 is the

jury advised that knowledge is an element of the
offense.

The instruction goes on to say that if the

jurors are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of "all
of the essential elements of the offense as above-set
forth, the Defendant is guilty ... " (emphasis added)·
-6-
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The instruction challenged clearly tells the jury
that they must find the Defendant guilty, even though
the Defendant is without knowledge, if the other elements have been proved.
Instructing the jury with instruction number 5
was error which could not fail to prejudice the Defendant.

The trial court must fully instruct the jury

on all essential elements of a crime.

See State v.

Clingerman, 516 P.2d 1022, 213 Kan. 525 (l!t73),
Thomas v. State, 522 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1974).
The trial court goes on, in instruction number &,
to seemingly offer the jury an alternate ground fer
finding the Defendant guilty.

Instruction number &1

set forth in its entirety, states:
Any person who issues or passes a check for the
purpose of obtaining from any person any money, pro- '·
perty or thing of value knowing it will not be paid
by the drawee bank and payment is refused by the
drawee bank is guilty of issuing a bad check.
Instruction number 6 clearly tells the jury that:

~;·

7l.•i

. ,~ft~

:~

:'~

. ,ij

-~~~~
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\

they might find the Defendant guilty without regard
to his 'intent to defraud, without regard to the amount
of the check, without regard to why payment is refused,
and without regard to whether the Defendant had
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sufficient funds or credit.
dicial error.

This, again, was preju-

See State v. Clingerman, supra.
POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFEND~..NT

IN OFFERING INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE CONFUSING AND

CONTRADICTORY.
As previously discussed, instructions 5 and 6
were erroneous in that they instructed the jury to
find the Defendant guilty without one or another
essential elements.

Instructions 5 and 6 are also

confusing and contradictory.

Each instruction pur-

ports to set forth the conditions under which the
jury must find the Defendant guilty.

Each is seem-

ingly a complete standard in itself.
The offering of separate, differing standards of
guilt is inevitably confusing to a lay jury and is
prejudicial error.

State v. Hendricks, 258 P.2d 452

123 Ut 267.
It is not the function of an appeal to weigh
evidence.

Nonetheless, a result which is completely

unsupported by evidence cannot stand.
~·

346 P.2d 185 (Oklahoma 1959).

Kunkel v.
For that reason

the judgment below should be reversed and Defendant's
motion to dismiss granted.

Further, the trial court's
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instructions to the jury were prejudicial and would
entitle the Defendant to a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be
reversed.

Respectfully Submitted,

JOHN G. MULLINER
MULLINER & MCCULLOUGH
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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